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Reviewed by Christopher Tomlins
Christopher Columbus Langdell in his lifetime did not lack for an occasional
champion. Though his unusual approach to teaching at Harvard Law School
bewildered many of his students at the outset, it was fiercely defended by
a minority, who “proudly assumed the eponym of…‘Kit’s freshmen’ and
considered themselves the ‘best men’ in the school” even as they were mocked
for it by the remainder.1 Though faculty colleagues were antagonized by his
obstinacy in pursuit of reform at the law school, he had the backing of the
University’s president, Charles Eliot, who had recruited him to the deanship,
and he quickly gained a right-hand man in James Barr Ames, whom Langdell
made American legal education’s first (and for a long time only) professor
selected according to criteria of academic merit.
Still, detraction has been Langdell’s more usual fate, especially in the world
of legal education he did so much to create. The leading epithets are known
far and wide: Holmes’ “greatest living legal theologian”; Grant Gilmore’s
“an essentially stupid man.”2 Paul Carrington offered a more considered
disparagement in his 1995 “appreciation” of Langdell on the centennial of
his retirement as Dean of Harvard Law School. Puckishly entitled, “Hail!
Langdell!” Carrington’s eulogy was a distinctly backhanded salute. Langdell
“had devised a novel theory of American law, a new method of instruction, and
a program of credentialing that made his school a paradigm for American legal
education.”3 A notable trifecta. But Carrington deprecated the institutional
innovations (the credentialing) that had created the amply funded ground on
which he himself stood; nor could he detect a smidgen of intellectual worth
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in the novel legal theory. The one leg of the tripod Carrington had time for
was Langdell’s new “case method” of instruction, but only because wiser men
than Langdell, perceiving a moral subtext where he saw only the surface gloss
of “legal science,” had effected a separation of the method from its author’s
madness, and so freed posterity from “transcendental nonsense” to teach
the enduring morality “of republican politics and law.”4 Once successfully
detached from his single defensible achievement, Carrington’s Langdell
came across as mostly a failure and a fool—an unsuccessful lawyer, awkward
bookish recluse, mulish and credulous intellectual, dredged from obscurity to
do the bidding of an ambitious educational entrepreneur (Eliot) by creating a
philistine’s brand of legal education premised on the elevation of institutional
status over service and sterile technique over politics.5
Though he denied any intent to patronize, Carrington’s terse biography
clearly achieved it in substance. Called upon to comment, two legal historians,
John Henry Schlegel and Laura Kalman, did Langdell the greater courtesy
of finding him important enough to damn in his own right.6 However, a
third, William LaPiana, did more. LaPiana invited readers to consider two
unnerving possibilities: first, that Langdell might actually have been a scholar
of some sophistication and learning; second, and more important, that the
conception and method of legal education he had devised, though of course
narrow by current standards, nevertheless had the cardinal virtue of creating
a modern legal profession trained precisely to look elsewhere than politics for
its sense of validity and relevance. “By making the mastery of legal science
the hallmark of professional competency and prestige, case method education
gave lawyers a claim to social position and power based less on the defense
of certain ideas about society and government than on apparently apolitical
expertise.” From a late 20th century standpoint, LaPiana suggested, a legal
profession whose measure of success was technical capacity to do what it did
well might actually be preferable to one trained from this point of a twirling
compass or that to do good. In Langdell as scholar and teacher, LaPiana espied
a craftsman’s modesty, wholesomely detached from an architect’s ambition.7
At the time he wrote in rebuttal of Carrington, LaPiana’s own published
research had already established a firmer basis for—dare-one-say—judicious
assessment of the origins of modern American legal education and C.C.
Langdell’s role at its inception than could be found anywhere else in
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contemporary legal-historical scholarship.8 Since the late 1990s, however, the
baton has been carried by Bruce Kimball. Coming from a background in the
history of education and of the professions rather than legal history, Kimball’s
principal interest was in Langdell the educator. But in the course of nearly
fifteen years of research he has successfully broadened that interest to Langdell
the lawyer and legal scholar. Kimball’s research has already been widely enough
disseminated to attract the attention of anyone with an interest in Langdell or
the history of legal education; over the last ten years he has published some
dozen articles on both, clustered principally in three journals—the Journal of
Legal Education,9 the Law and History Review,10 and Law and Social Inquiry.11 From the
outset, however, Kimball’s intention was always to write a biography that would
situate Langdell at a specific crossroads—Harvard’s invention of the modern
American law school, Langdell’s role in that invention, and the relationship
of that invention to the inception of modern professional education. That
biography is now before us. How successful has Kimball been?
A successful biography generally demands a subject whose recorded life
is rich enough to sustain a reader’s curiosity about how this person came to
think and act in a particular way—or in the absence of record, an author willing
to imagine enough of the web of relations between a formed self (body and
intellect) and formative circumstance to fill in the blanks. Kimball’s Langdell
makes it across this particular threshold—but only just. Langdell is born in
1826 to a New Hampshire farm household, the third of five children, three boys
and two girls. It is a hard place, and for a good thirty years, his will be a hard
life. By the time he is seven, his mother and both brothers are dead, his father
is in penury, he and two sisters have been dispersed to relatives and beyond.
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The younger sister will die in 1847, leaving him an effective family of one elder
and supportive sister who in 1850 will move far away to Kansas. It is unclear
whether brother and sister ever meet again. He is a virtual pauper throughout
his adolescence and early adulthood, attends local schools and then Phillips
Exeter Academy on scholarship, supports himself— and his father—by millwork
and teaching. He moves on in his early twenties to Harvard, where after a year
he can no longer make ends meet, returns to Exeter and obtains a law office
apprenticeship. On completion of his apprenticeship, he returns once more to
Harvard to enroll in the law school, again on scholarship, and by 1853 has a law
degree and a reputation amongst his peers not only for fanatical devotion to
his studies but also “genius.” He becomes acquainted with the young Charles
Eliot, then an undergraduate in the College, researches thousands of cases
on contracts for Theophilus Parsons, and in 1854, leaves for New York, where
contacts with law school classmates help him establish himself in practice and
begin to earn a decent living. Kimball describes well the formative privation
of Langdell’s early life and stresses the thread of education and study that runs
through it as emotional solace. One can see why. Still, the man who emerges
from Kimball’s account of his youth remains elusive—not morose nor selfpitying, but still introverted, perhaps taciturn, certainly lonely.12 Eventually
he will marry, though quite late in life (1880), to a woman thirty years his
junior. They enjoy a tender and intimate relationship until he dies. She dies
a year later. Perhaps one signature of a deep emotional privacy is the virtual
absence of his marriage from his life story. Or perhaps his biographer was not
interested in the marriage. Kimball tells us of an extensive correspondence
between Langdell and his elder sister, but not what they wrote about.
Whatever the absence of record or perspective that leaves one guessing
about the man, Kimball makes up for it in his careful reconstruction of the
man’s professional career, first as lawyer, subsequently as law professor and
Harvard law dean. Kimball’s Langdell is not Carrington’s cartoon. By 1860,
six years after leaving Harvard, he has become a successful and innovative
lawyer in New York City with a “flourishing practice” (42), a sterling
reputation as a shrewd and effective attorney, and a technician’s mastery of
the era’s increasingly complex litigation, particularly in the realms of wills and
estates, equity procedure, and commercial law. Work in Langdell’s Wall Street
office acquaints him with a tendency that will only become more pronounced
in big city practice—the relatively lessened importance of “grand style” court
room combat compared with exacting preparation of extended written briefs
(65–6). Thus, Langdell’s personal trajectory serves as an example of the
significant shift in litigation from trials based on principles to briefs based on
cases, and of a split between trial and paper lawyers in the practice of litigation
that reproduces in the American case something of the explicitly bifurcated
12.
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English profession.13 He is an honest and ethical man in a corrupt city, highminded, but not a prig. In building a legal career, he shows himself capable of
the occasional dubious decision (55), even the occasional sharp practice (77–
82); nor does he avoid association with those willing to practice sharper (61–
6, 70–1). Still, Langdell’s law is technique not influence; his careerism extols
merit and application, ability and learning, not connection and clout. In his
view, “scientific expertise, academic merit, professional success, and equal
opportunity” should coincide. When confronted by evidence they do not, as
proves to be the case in Tweed’s New York, he is outraged. In May, 1868, one
former classmate tells another that he has encountered Langdell “breathing
out slaughter against the New York judicial system and judiciary” (69). The
Augean Stables of the Tweed Ring and of Tammany Hall, and in particular
the wholesale connivance of the bar on exhibition in the Erie Wars of the
late 1860s, cool his enthusiasm for practice. Disenchantment coincides with
an invitation from young Eliot, newly risen to Harvard’s presidency (October,
1869), to return to Cambridge, become the law school’s first dean, and join
Eliot’s efforts to flip the University “like a flapjack” (86)—a more manageable
task, Langdell may have thought, than flipping New York. In January, 1870,
Langdell accepts an appointment as Dane Professor of Law, succeeding
Parsons. In February, he returns to Cambridge. Upon installation as dean
the following September, he immediately sets about the innovations that will
implement his ideal. They will mean a revolution in American professional
education.
The chapters that follow, on Langdell’s Harvard Law revolution, are the
heart of this book and the most rewarding. Until we get to them, it’s fair to say,
Kimball’s research is assiduous but his exposition no more than serviceable. His
reconstruction of Langdell’s accomplished Wall Street career is extraordinarily
repetitive. We first meet Langdell “breathing out slaughter,” for example, on
page 69, then again on 71, again on 73 and again— after a short break—on 82
(and again, after a long break, lest we forget, on 271). It is a quirky phrase, and
it serves to underline a point that Kimball makes over and over—that a century
before the neologism was coined, Langdell was a devout meritocrat who
“scorn[ed] to win, or to struggle for, any success which was not the legitimate
reward of merit.”14 The observation is important—a key to the man, to our
understanding of the philosophy of professional education he would set in
motion, and also to what Kimball terms his tragedy (1). Whether Langdell
was, indeed, a tragic figure we can determine in due course. For the present,
perhaps it’s worth pausing a moment to sympathize with his biographer: the
very recurrence of observations like the “breathing” fragment might suggest
artless writing, or it might indicate how seldom pithy moments of commentary
or insight turned up in the materials Kimball was able to amass. Tragic or
not, Langdell is a strangely shadowed presence in this book. “[C]haracteristic
insularity” (201) is not an easy nut for a biographer to crack.
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Though repetition—of observations, points of argument, phrases,
anecdotes—remains a mark of his book throughout, Kimball’s exposition
nevertheless improves as he turns to Langdell as scholar, teacher and dean,
to the state of Harvard Law as his (and Eliot’s) great experiment unfolds,
and to the detail of the innovations Langdell unleashed there. In his twentyfive years as dean, Langdell: elevated the standard of faculty scholarship;
introduced enduring changes in classroom pedagogy; fought for the
recruitment of academically qualified faculty and the creation of an academic
career track; established meritocratic structures and policies in academic
administration and curriculum; and reversed the prevailing “commercial”
logic of professional education—maintain low standards and low tuition to
attract sufficient students and revenue to turn a profit—by instituting a high
standard, high cost regime that represented a liberal professional education as
an inherently valuable credential that also would prove economically valuable
to prospective employers.
Langdell’s innovations are already well known in outline. Kimball’s
achievement in analyzing them is two-fold. First, he underscores the animating
philosophy that rendered each element part of a larger system—the “new set
of legitimating relationships among a profession, its domain within society,
the expertise of the professionals, and their education” (2). He leaves us
in no doubt that this was Langdell’s own personal philosophy. “Langdell
maintained that the just working of the legal system relies on the effectiveness
of the legal profession, which depends on lawyers’ expertise derived, in turn,
from their academic achievement in law school. Academic merit determines
the effectiveness and the integrity of the members of ‘a learned and liberal
profession of the highest grade,’ who will then ‘render to the public the
highest and best service in the administration of justice.’” Education must
teach expertise, for only expertise could result in practice of the highest
standard; but education also must inculcate the single standard of merit, for
only meritorious reward was virtuous and only virtuous practice could ensure
professional legitimacy (2, also 342–3). Though clearly Langdell and Eliot
were in close accord in their conception of professional education, Langdell
was no hired cipher of Harvard’s president. Rather, ideas developed in the
light of his own education and life experience that Langdell first put in place
in the domain of legal education became a model for professional education at
large. Hence Kimball’s title, tying Langdell’s name not just to the inception of
modern legal education but also to modern professional education in general.
Kimball’s Langdell is the driving force, and on a wide front.
Second, Kimball systematically creates a thorough, detailed narrative of
Langdell’s activities in each of his five realms of innovation. Cumulatively, the
result is a Langdell ably rescued from posterity’s condescension. As scholar,
Langdell invented and refined the case book, made substantive contributions,
successively, to contracts jurisprudence and equity jurisdiction, and—late
in life—entered debate on contemporary issues in constitutional law and
antitrust policy. Throughout, he employed a far more complex form of legal
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reasoning—“a comprehensive yet contradictory integration of induction from
authority, deduction from principle, and analysis of justice and policy” (6,
124–29)—than the rude “formalist” label is capable of conveying. A highlight
of Kimball’s discussion of Langdell’s scholarship is his careful tracking of the
cotillion it danced in response and reaction to Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., an
interlocution from which Langdell emerges—at least during his lifetime—far
more the innovator than Holmes, whom we encounter, in turn, as admiring
and dismissive depending on the state of his own ambitions, consistent only
in his predilection to a certain peevishness. As teacher, Langdell, of course,
created the case method of instruction, the roots of which Kimball traces to
Langdell’s youthful interest in education, to his own activities as a law student,
and to his experience as practitioner. Kimball’s own skills as a researcher
are shown to particular effect here in his resourceful and imaginative use of
students’ annotated casebooks to reconstruct Langdell in Socratic classroom
action. This chapter draws on one of Kimball’s finest and earliest articles on
Langdell, published in the Law and History Review; a separate chapter adds new
detail and depth to our knowledge of student life and instruction at Harvard
Law in the early years of Langdell’s deanship by drawing on Kimball’s
reconstruction of the paths of four representative students through the school
and its classrooms, first published in the Journal of Legal Education.15
As law school dean, meanwhile, we encounter Langdell determinedly and
tenaciously pressing for the application of academic merit to the hiring of
faculty, the design of the curriculum, and the admission, examination and
advancement of students, and attempting to institutionalize meritocracy as a
formal system of academic administration—“rational, impersonal policies and
rules guiding incremental progress that could be measured objectively” (193)—
to take the place of informal, gentlemanly consensus in governing the school
and its activities. Interestingly, Kimball observes, Langdell proved to be much
more an educational than a legal formalist. A practitioner’s experience had
taught Langdell the limits of the legal formalism to which he was instinctively
attracted, as the triangular reasoning on display in his legal scholarship attests.
In educational matters, where his experience was more limited, his formalism
ran unrestrained.
So completely would Langdell’s model reshape professional education in
America, that it is salutary to be reminded how long the dean had to feud with
his colleagues and how uncertain his success actually was. Much of Kimball’s
account of Langdell’s deanship is a narrative of conflict and deadlock. The
little club of Brahmin practitioners that was the law school’s faculty remained,
well into the 1880s, completely unpersuaded of the merits of any of Langdell’s
innovations. They were discomfited initially by Eliot’s very interference in
their gentlemanly management of the school. Before his retirement (essentially
forced by Eliot), Theophilus Parsons had been the most senior professor and,
as such, acted as “head” of school. Emory Washburn expected to succeed him.
“In 1870 no one knew exactly what a dean did” (167). Some sort of secretarial
15.
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work, perhaps. They were discomfited further by their discovery not only that
the dean was no secretary, but that the new incumbent, Langdell, was—at least
by their lights—no gentleman. He was not a boor; in 1881, Holmes (fifteen
years his junior) pronounced him “a noble old swell” (104, 195). But certainly,
in his dogged pursuit of change, he did not behave as a gentleman should.
As Kimball observes, this, of course, was the point of his appointment. Had
Langdell been “a gentleman,” there would have been no change: the very
reason he was appointed was to initiate a transformation that no gentleman
would have willingly countenanced—the transformation of the profession’s
existing gentry culture by inculcation of an ethos of professionalism. Early on,
Langdell gained a needed ally in Ames, whose appointment in 1872 to replace
Nathaniel Holmes (whose resignation Eliot had requested) conformed to
Langdell’s unorthodox idea of renewing the school by hiring young faculty on
the (ungentlemanly) basis of academic achievement. Four more appointments
made in the ten years after Ames, however, were all “from the ranks of the
active profession” (175)—first James B. Thayer, then John Chipman Gray, then
Charles S. Bradley (at which point a disgusted Ames offered his resignation),
then Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. Holmes replaced the incompetent Bradley,
but his own appointment quickly turned into a charade when Holmes’
ambition took him, instead, off to the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court.
William Keener filled the gap—the first appointment in a decade to conform to
the Ames model. But Thayer and Gray were horrified and complained bitterly.
Not until the early 1890s was there any further implementation of meritorious
academic hiring of young faculty, and then only on a quid pro quo basis
balancing the appointment of senior established “scholarly” practitioners.
“[R]ecent graduates like Ames became the norm for new faculty appointees”
only after 1900 (190).
Langdell was frustrated in the matter of appointments because, for all
his vocal support, Eliot trimmed, in part for financial reasons, in part in
response to pressures from the faculty and from the University’s Corporation
and Board of Overseers. Langdell enjoyed greater success, comparatively, in
curricular and admissions reform during his first decade, where his objectives
were an organized, sequenced curriculum spread first over two and then three
years; written examinations; the admission requirement of a college degree or
entrance examination; and the addition of an honors track. All were designed
to create a professional education characterized by academic distinction.
Eliot’s support in curricular matters was consistent, notwithstanding
fluctuations in enrollments attending implementation of Langdell’s “very
restrictive measures,” and all of the desired reforms had been effected by
the end of the 1870s (221, 222). Even so, conflict was fierce, particularly over
Langdell’s ungentlemanly insistence that his own courses be given the key role
in defining academic distinction within the school.
Overall, the transformation of Harvard Law required at least fifteen years in
curricular matters, more than twenty-five years in appointments policy. Bitter
struggles—a 19th century Beirut—were its watchword. Yet for all the contention,
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Langdell eventually emerged triumphant. Declines in enrollment following
each major curriculum reform proved temporary, although the decline that
followed the introduction of the three-year curriculum and entrance restrictions
was prolonged by the early 1880s recession. By the mid-1880s, the school was
prospering; by the end of the decade, it was a runaway success, its graduates
finding ready employers in the big city corporate firms whose genesis Langdell
had been able to observe twenty years before on Wall Street. By 1895, when
Langdell retired from the deanship, his model was spreading fast.
Kimball, then, has shown us that C.C. Langdell overcame a deprived
youth to become a highly regarded law student, a lawyer of consequence, a
scholar of greater consequence—good enough for his lead to be followed on
more than one occasion (without attribution) by the revered Holmes—and
a pioneer of professional education. Though reserved, he was by no means
friendless; though he had known poverty, he was unfailingly generous; though
an introvert, he married and enjoyed a loving relationship with his wife. Those
with whom he disagreed called him arrogant, relentless, and autocratic, but
these are not unusual terms in academic fights (or those in the outside world);
and in his relations with his wife and adult friends, he displayed “a ‘tender,
almost feminine nature’” (13). Throughout his life, he found it very difficult to
come to terms with the death of those close to him; given his early life, this is
unsurprising.
Though one might hesitate to call Langdell an extraordinary man, one can
properly acknowledge a life of no little achievement against the odds. Why
then call the story of this life “a tragedy both in form and content” (1)? This
smacks a little of reaching. To be sure, Kimball discovers sadness—poverty and
loneliness early in life, blindness in later life. Sadness is not tragedy. He also
discovers hypocrisy. Langdell the meritocrat fails his own meritocratic test. In
the 1870s he insists “that his own academic specialty of equity should be the
sine qua non of the honor degree at HLS” (273, also 226). Langdell had reason
to doubt the rigor of his colleagues’ teaching—all but Ames—but “he still
violated the most fundamental principle of his own system: that evaluation
should proceed by disinterested, formal standards of academic merit” (273).
The violation reappears more ominously in the 1890s, when Langdell makes
explicit his opposition to the admission to the law school of women and
graduates of Catholic colleges. Once more, the ideology of meritocracy seems
exposed as a sham by its advocate’s own “limitations of self-interest, cultural
background, and inherent subjectivity” (273). Meritocrats, of course, did not
see it that way themselves: Langdell thought that as a matter of aptitude “the
law is entirely unfit for the feminine mind—more so than any other subject”
(289). The basis of his antagonism toward Catholic colleges is not openly
stated, but he certainly acted on it without any apparent second thought.
In form, a tragic hero is cast down by his flaw or error. We are offered no
evidence that Langdell’s prejudices had any measurable adverse effect on
his own life: no shame, no disgrace. He was, says Kimball, sure enough in
his opinion of the feminine mind to voice it in meetings where gentlemen

666

Journal of Legal Education

preferred to dissemble. Nor, without greater willingness than Kimball has
shown to explore and interpret those aspects of his life that Kimball finds
Langdell’s prejudices contradicting—“personal relationships with educated
women” (291), namely, his mother, his sisters, particularly his elder sister
Hannah, and his wife—could one begin to find the content of Langdell’s life
tragic. Kimball dances around the edges: he alludes to the higher priority
Langdell appeared to place, personally, on educating men than women. The
young son of a deceased law school custodian had, Langdell thought, more
claim than the boy’s elder sister on a fund set aside to educate the custodian’s
children. Himself, the orphaned younger son of a poor farm family, Langdell
feared for the boy’s future—and so he asked Eliot to allow the law school to
pay for the sister’s education instead of drawing on the fund (291). Kimball
also alludes, tantalizingly, to the “scholarly manliness” of late 19th century
professional education, to law school as its most intense expression, and to
case method as the epitome (Ames thought it “virile” compared to recitation)
of manly struggle (293). What did this man, “tender, almost feminine” with
his intimates, gain psychologically from manly struggle with his students, such
that he could not countenance the presence of women? If his life is to be judged
tragic, his biographer should make more attempt to answer questions like this.
Kimball chooses, instead, to assimilate Langdell’s clearly held prejudices to
the dissimulations of turn-of-the-century meritocratic discourse: “Employing
the ‘categorical thinking’ of educational formalism, the meritocrats classified
women and graduates of Catholic colleges apart from the other applicants,
and then declared the former an exception to the standard of academic merit
and applied special scrutiny to the latter. Mediated by these policies, the
invidious discrimination seemed invisible to the meritocrats, who continued
to believe in their commitment to academic meritocracy, even as the ‘just’
system discriminated against these categories of people during the triumphal
inception of the system that should have, in principle, opened doors to
admit them” (308). As explanation, this is unexceptionable enough, but it is
sociology, not tragedy.
In the absence of tragedy, we are left with a biographer’s regret at the
failings of a subject he has come to admire. Kimball himself believes deeply
in the possibility of professional meritocracy. The last sentence of his last
chapter enjoins us to consider that academic meritocracy may “like democracy
in political life…still be the best of the worst ways of organizing professional
life” (346). He wishes that, at the inception of modern professional education,
Langdell’s own commitment had not proven, in certain grave respects,
insincere.
Kimball’s own eulogy of Langdell, nevertheless, credits both life and works.
Neither legal theologian nor in essence a stupid man, neither failure nor fool,
Christopher Columbus Langdell has proven capable of inspiring a biography
that plainly describes the lawyering of which he was justifiably proud, the
scholarship that wasted no words on fripperies, and above all the dogged
creation of a system of professional education characterized by methods and
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ideas still plainly recognizable 140 years after its inception. Lector, si monumentum
requiris, circumspice. Paul Carrington described Langdell as a practical man, and
though that is clearly not all he was, practical is at least part of what he was,
the part he was willing to let show. A practical man has inspired a largely
practical biography. No doubt this particular man would have been upset had
his biographer attempted to see more.

